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10.1  Introduction 
An article entitled provocatively “Hollywood 1,  Japan 0” appeared recently 
in the national press (Sterngold 1995). It reported that the president of Matsu- 
shita Electric  Industrial  Company  paid a brief visit to  the chairman of the 
American entertainment conglomerate MCA early in April 1995 and informed 
him coldly that Matsushita had sold its controlling interest in MCA to Sea- 
gram’s, a Canadian firm.  This foreign direct investment was the single largest 
purchase of an American corporation by a Japanese firm; Matsushita had ac- 
quired MCA for $6.6 billion in 1990 and sold 80 percent of its stake for $5.7 
billion in 1995. During the same period, the comparable return from holding an 
open position in yen was greater than 13 percent per year. How do investment 
decisions like this one affect Matsushita’s shareholders? Also, if this kind of 
foreign direct investment is typical of the flow of capital out of  Japan in the 
past two decades, what are the macroeconomic implications of the continuing 
Japanese external surplus of the past 15 years? 
This chapter answers these questions in two ways. First, it describes two 
new measures of a country’s external surplus that are based in economic theory. 
One is called the aggregate generational  current account, ‘ and the other pre- 
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1. Fisher (1995) defines the aggregate generational current account, and Fisher and Woo (1997) 
calibrate this statistic for the postwar Korean economy. The term “aggregate generational current 
account” is a bit of  a misnomer because in practice one ignores the generational heterogeneity that 
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sents a generational  cross section of the net foreign  assets of Japanese resi- 
dents. Both extend the important work of Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff 
(1991) to the open economy. Second, it uses data from Japan’s balance of pay- 
ments in the past two decades to calibrate these measures. The value of Japan’s 
external assets, measured at market prices, has been somewhat higher than that 
of its net international investment position, measured at historical prices. This 
fact is true because the surge in Japanese outward investment occurred in the 
first part of the past decade. Although  Japanese investments in real estate in 
the United States have suffered some spectacular recent losses,?  Japan’s over- 
seas assets have enjoyed large capital gains because securities prices in world 
markets have risen sharply in the past 15 years. 
The measures calculated in this chapter are intuitively related to the well- 
being of the Japanese. The aggregate generational current account is the entire 
profile of the annual change in the expected present value of net foreign assets 
broadly defined. Thus it captures changes in the expected present value of the 
goods and services that a country can import from abroad. For domestic resi- 
dents, one aggregate generational current account profile is ex ante Pareto su- 
perior to another if, at all time horizons, the present value of the stock of net 
foreign assets is greater for the former than the latter. For example, consider a 
one-off  capital  gain  that  increases  the  present  value  of  Japan’s net  foreign 
assets. This change raises the expected utility of some Japanese residents and 
thus, with an appropriate  internal  redistribution  of  wealth, permits  a Pareto 
improvement for all current and future residents. On the other hand, consider 
an increase in Japan’s expected official transfers to abroad, perhaps as a part of 
a commitment to pay for the Allies’ military expenses in the Gulf War. Such a 
transfer implies an analogous Pareto worsening for the residents of Japan.’ 
The aggregate generational current account is constructed in two big steps. 
First, one determines the market value of net foreign assets. Second, one capi- 
talizes expected transfers from abroad. The sum of these two after any history 
is a country’s net foreign assets position defined broadly. The present value of 
is at the heart of Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff‘s measure. The phrase “a utility-theoretic mea- 
sure of  the external surplus’’ is perhaps too pompous. I have elected to use the phrase “aggregate 
generational” to place my work firmly within the tradition started by those authors and continued 
recently by Ablett (1996).  Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1994)  give a nice overview of the 
literature on generational accounts. 
2. On  12 May  1995, the front page of the New York Times reported that Mitsubishi Estate Com- 
pany, the holding company that had purchased an 80 percent stake in Rockefeller Center for $1.4 
billion. was filing for bankruptcy. The Sirnq  ofQrrrenr Busirtess (May 1994, tables 5.1 and 5.2) 
shows that real estate purchases represented about 15 percent of Japanese direct investment into 
the  United  States in  1992 and  1993. This is a  small fraction of Japan’s  purchases of  dollar- 
denominated securities in those years. 
3. The utility generated by the provision of public goods has not as yet been incorporated into 
the calculation of generational accounts. Thus the appropriate comparison here is between a world 
in which the Japanese enjoy the benefits of global military security without having to pay unilateral 
transfers and one in which the Japanese enjoy these benefits and also shoulder some concomitant 
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this stock of assets puts the current account into an intertemporal frame~ork.~ 
Finally, first differences of this present value show how the stock of external 
assets evolves across time and through history. If the aggregate generational 
current account is consistently positive, as is the case for Japan in the 20 years 
between 1973 and 1992, then a country’s net foreign assets are increasing more 
rapidly than world interest rates over a long horizon. In a dynamically efficient 
world economy, such a situation represents the expectation of a higher future 
standard of living owing to expected investment income from abroad. 
The aggregate generational current account thus uses two standard tech- 
niques of generally accepted accounting principles: first, it evaluates net for- 
eign assets at market value, not historical cost; and, second, it forces the econo- 
mist to use an accrual accounting method to evaluate foreseeable international 
commitments. From a theoretical  perspective, both of these practices  make 
enormous sense. Of course, the difficulty in constructing theoretically mean- 
ingful economic statistics is that they are only as good as the assumptions one 
uses to compute them. 
In this chapter, I assume that no Japanese transfer to abroad is enduring. 
Thus the consistently negative balance for unilateral transfers on current ac- 
count does not reflect the expectation of an enduring Japanese commitment to 
a larger geopolitical role. If  this assumption is wrong, then I have overesti- 
mated the level of Japan’s net foreign assets. Also, I have evaluated Japan’s net 
foreign  assets only in four regions: the United  States, Western Europe, the 
Communist bloc, and Australia. Japan has played a historically important role 
in several rapidly growing Asian economies. Since  I have excluded these coun- 
tries from my  analysis, I may have underestimated  the value of  Japan’s net 
foreign assets. Further, I have used equity prices, bond prices, and exchange 
rates from the United Kingdom only to revalue all of Japan’s Western European 
assets. If the rates of return on European assets in general have been higher in 
the past 20 years, then I have underestimated the level of Japan’s net foreign 
assets. Finally, I have assumed that Japan’s assets in the United  States have 
borne market rates  of return.  If  Japanese investors suffer consistently  large 
losses from real estate holdings, then I have overestimated slightly their net 
foreign assets in the United States. 
This chapter also presents a generational cross section of the net foreign 
assets of Japan in 1992. Using data on household savings and borrowing rates, 
I construct the portfolios of net foreign assets of 19 different age cohorts. Dif- 
ferent groups hit their years of peak savings in different years. Thus some gen- 
erations benefited quite substantially from the large capital gains that Japan’s 
overseas investments experienced in the past decade, while others had not yet 
4. Since nominal interest rates include a component for expected inflation, the present value of 
the stock of net foreign assets deflates these assets both for inflation and the opportunity cost of 
holding real balances. Ulan and Dewald (1989) correct the U.S. stock of net foreign assets for 
inflation and for market value effects, but they do not consider the full implications of the dynamic 
pattern of asset accumulation. 318  Eric 0”. Fisher 
accumulated sufficient wealth to have gained much from that boom. For ex- 
ample, this generational profile of net foreign assets shows that Japanese resi- 
dents in their forties and fifties stand to lose proportionally most from a drop 
in dollar-denominated bond prices, whereas older generations  lose less be- 
cause they do not hold as large portfolio shares in dollar-denominated assets. 
The broad picture that emerges from the data is that the market value of 
Japan’s overseas assets was about 30 percent higher in 1992 than the Bank of 
Japan’s official estimates. The rate of return on European assets was quite high, 
whereas assets held in the United States bore positive but not stellar returns. 
Since Japan held about $680 billion in net foreign assets in 1992, the degree 
of interdependence between Japan and the world economy is probably greater 
now than at any other time in history. 
The rest of this chapter consists of four sections. Readers interested in the 
theoretical arguments showing that the conventional current account is ill de- 
fined should focus closely on section 10.2. Section 10.3  presents rough calcula- 
tions of the market value of Japan’s net foreign assets from 1973  through 1992. 
That section calibrates a benchmark using the status quo ex ante in the world 
economy in 1992. Section 10.4 presents the generational cross section of the 
distribution of these assets. Then it analyzes the effects on the welfare of Japan 
of three different scenarios: a continued strong yen, higher dollar interest rates, 
and rapid Chinese economic growth. Section 10.5 presents a brief conclusion. 
The chapter ends with a data appendix. 
10.2  An Illustrative Model 
Consider a country trading in a larger world economy. There are two genera- 
tions, and the world economy lasts for two periods: the present and an uncer- 
tain future. Uncertainty is summarized by a random variable whose realization 
is denoted by  0 E 8,  the latter denoting the set of all possible future states 
of the world. This random variable  summarizes both intrinsic and extrinsic 
uncertainty in the market, and its distribution is common knowledge. Intrinsic 
uncertainty is related to production, consumption, and government policy deci- 
sions, while extrinsic uncertainty captures the notion  that market equilibria 
may be subject to a degree of randomness independent of the fundamentals of 
the world economy. 
In the domestic economy, there is one representative agent in each genera- 
tion. Agent 0 lives for one period only, and agent l lives for two periods. Let 
x; be the vector describing agent 0’s consumption bundle; a subscript denotes 
a person and a superscript denotes a time period. Since  x; has several elements, 
one can think of  it as consisting of many different goods and services, both 
traded and not traded, that influence the utility of agent 0. Likewise, the state- 
contingent consumption profile  of agent  1 is  [x1,x:(0)]. Preferences  for the 
people in the domestic economy are summarized by  u,(x,!,), a utility function 
for agent 0, and E{u,([x~,x~(0)])},  an expected utility function for agent  1, 319  Generational Accounts in the Open Economy 
where the expectation is taken with respect to the information available in the 
first period. 
Let ah  be the value of agent 0’s initial assets, yh her income, and gh  the do- 
mestic government’s net transfers to her. Net transfers from the domestic gov- 
ernment are positive if the agent’s subsidies exceed her tax obligations. Like- 
wise, a;  is the initial wealth of agent 1, (yl,y:(O))  that agent’s income profile, 
and (gi,g:(0)) his state-contingent government net transfers. It will be conve- 
nient to denote the ex post interest rate by i(0). 
Assume that asset markets are complete. Then a rational expectations equi- 
librium will entail that agents choose consumption plans that maximize ex- 
pected utility subject to the usual budget constraints. Let ch  and (c;,ci(0)) be 
solutions to these problems. Agent  1’s consumption plans depend in general 
on risk aversion, expected domestic and foreign transfers, and the profile of 
earned income. Now let s: -  at  = yi + gt -  c! be the increment to agent 1’s 
assets. Since -a;  = y; + g; -  ch,  the conventional current account in period 
1 is bi = S; - (a; + gh)  -  (a! + g!), the excess of domestic savings over 
investment. Likewise, the conventional current account in period 2 is b2(0)  = 
-[a;(O) + g:(e)],  where 4(0)  = [l + i(0)ls; is the law of motion for agent 1’s 
assets. Thus the conventional current account projile is 
The essence of Fisher’s (1995) argument is that the term S; -  at  is not well 
defined. Consider a fixed level of  initial wealth for agent 1. Then one can al- 
ways increase bi by raising net transfers from abroad by  one dollar and then 
imposing a offsetting state-contingent decrease in transfers in the amount of  I 
+ i(0)  in the next period. This change in the timing of transfers has no effect 
on the present value of the wealth of any agent after any history, and the con- 
sumption and utility  of each agent is unchanged in any  state of the world. 
But the conventional current account surplus has risen. Since the equilibrium 
allocations of the agent in the world economy are unchanged, agents’ expected 
utilities are not affected after any history. This argument is the essence of a 
general proof showing that the conventional current account can take on any 
value in all but the final period of any economy. In an economy with an infinite 
horizon, the conventional current account is arbitrary in every period! Since 
each agent’s expected utility is not affected by  the timing of these transfers, 
changes in the conventional current account profile need not be related at all 
to changes in the welfare of domestic residents. 
How should one interpret the rescheduling of these unilateral transfers from 
abroad? If this country has a valued fiat asset, then the government improves 
the conventional current account simply by delaying payments to abroad and 
promising forpigners principal and interest in the next period. Thus this year’s 
net interest piyments from abroad and conventional current account have in- 
creased. If the economy has no such asset, then the timing of transfers from 
abroad is a rescheduling of sovereign debt that leaves the present value of debt 320  Eric 0”. Fisher 
service unchanged in every state of the world. This “infusion of foreign official 
capital” leaves the present value of the equity of any international creditor un- 
changed, but it allows the conventional current account of the debtor country 
to be anything. 
Rescheduling taxes and transfers among the agents in the domestic economy 
does not influence the current account. Kotlikoff (1993) shows that a one dollar 
decrease in g;  that is offset by a future increase of 1 + i(0)  in the next period 
lowers current savings sf  just as much as the decrease in gi. Of course, this 
delayed transfer affects no agent’s utility  after any history. Still, the conven- 
tional  current  account is not  affected. Thus rescheduling  internal taxes and 
transfers is another policy tool allowing the government to make its internal 
deficit any number it wants in all but the final period! 
What  is  a  well-defined  measure  of  the  external  surplus?  Let  CT,  = d; 
+ f; + t; be the present value of agent 0’s assets, where d; denotes assets lo- 
cated domestically,fh net assets abroad, and t; the expected value of all current 
and future transfers from abroad. Since this definition includes expected for- 
eign transfers, ii, is thus broader than a;. Also, there is no superscript on this 
quantity because these assets incorporate the present value of all current and 
expected future transfers from abroad that accrue to agent 0. This definition is 
thus independent of time. Likewise, let 
ii, = dl  + f:  + t: + E((1 + i(O))-’t;(O)}, 
where the expected value of transfers accruing to agent 1 is explicit. 
Further, letfl =  f; +  fl be the present value of private net foreign assets of 
all current and future agents in the domestic economy at time 1. For a creditor 
country,fI  > 0 might  be the market value  of equity owned reflecting  past 
savings decisions of the economy. Likewise, let tl  = t; + ti + E{(  1 + i(O))-l 
t:(€J)}  be the aggregate values of net foreign assets net expected transfers from 
abroad. These transfers are assets in a broad  sense because they  reflect  the 
capitalized value of foreign economic aid. Both these aggregates are indexed 
by a time superscript because they represent the aggregate value of current and 
future net foreign assets, conditional on the history of the world economy up 
until time  1. These aggregates  are independent  of agents because they sum 
across all current and future agents in the domestic economy. 
In this simple economy, the profile of net foreign assets evolves according 
to the realization of the state of nature in the second period. Since there is only 
one (current and future) domestic agent in the second period, the present value 
of the aggregatesf2(0) = [l + i(e)]-y;(O)  and t’(0) = [l + i(€~)]-~t;(e)  should 
cause no confusion. Again, these aggregates depend only on time since the 
history of the world economy evolves through time. If the expected value of 
net foreign assets was zero in the status quo ex ante,5 the aggregate genera- 
tional current account pro$le  is 
5. This assumption is not innocuous. The aggregate generational current account is defined as 
a flow, just as the conventional current account is. In practical applications, one takes first differ- 321  Generational Accounts in the Open Economy 
The aggregate generational current account is the (history dependent) change 
in the expected present value of net foreign assets, broadly defined, across all 
generations alive and not yet born. This definition shows that a country’s wel- 
fare includes a component  capturing the expected  transfer  of real resources 
from abroad. In a more general model, equation (2) would sum across an infi- 
nite sequence of generations of domestic residents6 
Equation  (2)  defines  the  aggregate  generational  current  account  as  the 
change in the history-dependent stock of net foreign assets. In practical appli- 
cations, it is natural to construct annual changes in order to facilitate compari- 
sons with the conventional current account. But, in this and many other eco- 
nomic models, the demarcation of a period serves two functions: it keeps track 
of calendar time and differentiates between agents. Generational accounts are 
really indexed by the agents in an economy, and this fact has important impli- 
cations for how to use them.’ Since the aggregate generational current account 
is the increase in the present value of assets owned abroad, a surplus in this 
measure indicates that net foreign assets have risen more rapidly than the nomi- 
nal interest rate. Thus current and future generations can expect a larger inflow 
of goods and services than was the case before. 
The aggregate generational current account is useful for two purposes. First, 
it determines the extent to which  a country’s standard of living depends on 
receipt of goods and services from abroad. For example, if 6*(0) > 0, then 
agent  1 owns net foreign assets whose market value is larger than the initial 
net foreign asset position of the economy. This increase is larger than the loss 
in net foreign assets that occurred when agent 0 liquidated her portfolio, and it 
represents  a high rate of  domestic  savings,  realized  capital gains, or unex- 
pected transfers from abroad. There is an inherent legal asymmetry between 
net assets located abroad,f?(B)  + t;(0),  and those located at home, df(0).  Do- 
mestic assets are the liabilities of a corporate entity subject to some domestic 
juridical  authority; thus disputes arising because of ownership rights can be 
settled  fairly readily. Foreign  assets, however,  are riskier precisely  because 
there is no simple means for the resolution of conflicts between creditors and 
~ 
ences of the present value of the stock of net foreign assets. We have thus assumed implicitly that 
the stock defined in eq. (2) can be interpreted as a flow because the economy’s original valuation 
of net foreign assets was zero. 
6.  Let 6,  be the expected present value of the assets of domestic agent h born at some time in 
the distant future. If  there is no explicit program of foreign aid and no bequest motive in  the 
economy, then domestic assets, foreign assets, expected foreign transfers, and thus 6h  would all be 
zero. In this important case, the profile of the aggregate generational current account is simply the 
change in the present value of the economy’s net foreign asset position. Then the analogue of eq. 
(2) reports the profile of the present value the economy’s conventional current account with assets 
computed at market value. 
7. This important subtlety is recognized by Kotlikoff (1993). I think it has been the source of 
some confusion in the theoretical and practical interpretations of  generational accounts for the 
closed economy. See the interesting and though-provoking debate in Bohn (1992a),  Drazen (1992), 
and Bohn (1992b). 322  Eric 0”. Fisher 
debtors. Thus @(O) > 0 indicates that the domestic economy has become in- 
creasingly dependent on assets located abroad in maintaining its standard of 
living. 
Second, the aggregate generational current account shows how changes in 
policy  or exogenous variables affect the welfare of domestic residents. Con- 
sider a change in the stochastic processes  describing  expectations such that 
neither component of equation  (2)  decreases and at least one component in- 
creases after every relevant history. Such a change has at least three interpreta- 
tions. First, there has been a capital  gain in the market value of  net foreign 
assets, and thus some agent in the home country can expect to enjoy increased 
consumption now or later. Second, the interest differential has narrowed at all 
horizons, raising the value of foreign bonds or decreasing the value of domestic 
liabilities of fixed maturity. Third, the domestic currency  has experienced a 
real depreciation, lowering the value of liabilities denominated in the domestic 
currency. The crucial point is that each of these phenomena can be interpreted 
in terms of an increase in the expected utility of a representative agent in the 
domestic economy. Since equation (2) is defined using domestic aggregates, 
there exist lump-sum (domestic) taxes such that all agents in the home country 
are better off. 
There is no simple relationship between the conventional government deficit 
and the aggregate generational  current account.8 Since the conventional gov- 
ernment deficit is not well defined, this fact should come as no surprise. Of 
course, if foreigners do not acquire domestic assets, then government deficits 
involve only an internal redistribution  of wealth among the generations in a 
country. Then they influence the aggregate generational  current account only 
to the extent that they crowd out outward foreign investment. However, if for- 
eigners do acquire domestic fiat assets, then an internal deficit causes the ag- 
gregate generational current account to increase. Thus part of the burden of the 
national debt is the present value of the interest payments to foreigners. 
Another natural measure of  an economy’s net foreign  asset position is the 
profile of net foreign assets owned by the current and future generations of its 
residents. In this simple model, the only interesting such cross section is 
(3) 
where the second term depends on  the expected transfers from abroad to the 
agent in generation  1. This cross section must be taken at time 1 because there 
is no generational heterogeneity at time 2 in this simple model. These values 
simply divide an economy’s net international investment position, measured at 
market values and inclusive of expected transfers from abroad, among the sev- 
eral current and future generations of domestic residents. Of course, this cross 
section allows specifically for the generational heterogeneity that is at the heart 
of Auerbach et a1.k (1991) analogous measure for the domestic economy. 
8. Dewald and Ulan (1990) have made this point for the conventional current account. 323  Generational Accounts in the Open Economy 
Measuring  (2) or (3) requires making explicit assumptions about the sto- 
chastic processes driving exchange rates, interest rates, and international trans- 
fer policies. Thus the aggregate generational current account is only as good 
as the assumptions that are used to construct it, and economists must face an 
essential paradox. Cash flow accounts, like the conventional current account, 
are measured quite precisely, but compelling theoretical arguments show that 
they are potentially devoid of economic meaning. On the other hand, accrual 
accounts, such as the aggregate generational current account are measured im- 
precisely, but they do have sound foundations in economic theory. So one is 
caught between Scylla and Charybdis. Is it nobler to accept an accurate mea- 
surement of a meaningless number or to attempt a rough measure of a useful 
economic concept? Recognizing that I must now make many heroic assump- 
tions, I turn my attention to the latter endeavor using 20 years of data from the 
Japanese economy. 
10.3  Japan's Aggregate Generational Current Account 
The Bank of Japan reports regional balance-of-payments  statistics in the 
April and November issues of Balance of Payments M~nthly.~  These data are 
reported in millions of  current dollars, and they were the primary source for 
the historical statistics used to compile the aggregate generational current ac- 
count for Japan. The data cover the period from  1973 to 1992 and describe 
regional balances  with  the United  States, Western  Europe,  the Communist 
bloc,"' and Australia. These groups of countries have historically represented 
more than three-quarters of the aggregate bilateral trade of Japan. Taiwan, Ko- 
rean, Thailand, and Singapore form the only major trading group that was ex- 
cluded. Since the data were all reported in current dollars, I used the realized 
nominal interest rate on long-term government bonds in the United States for 
all relevant present value calculations. 
These regional balance-of-payments data are broken down into the current 
account and the capital  account. In  constructing  the aggregate  generational 
current account, I focused on inward and outward annual flows of long-term 
capital. The Balance of Payments Monthly reports changes in both assets and 
liabilities in these categories: direct investments,  trade credits, loans, securi- 
ties, external bonds, and others. I assumed that all assets were denominated in 
the currency of the host county and that all liabilities were denominated in yen. 
Outward direct investment is subject to capital gains for two reasons. First, 
changes in the exchange rate of the host country influence the market value of 
assets located abroad. Second. movements in local asset market indexes reflect 
9. Matsuoka and Rose (1994) give an excellent guide to Japanese economic statistics. Many 
Japanese publications have statistical sections with bilingual headings in Japanese and English. 
10. This nomenclature is a vestige of  the cold war. This group of  countries includes Russia, 
several other Eastern European countries, the People's Republic of  China, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
and other countries. 324  Eric 0”. Fisher 
capital gains and losses in local securities markets. The measure reported in 
this chapter captures both of these sources of fluctuations in asset prices. Like- 
wise, the market value of inward foreign direct investment into Japan fluctuates 
as the yen appreciates and depreciates and also as yen-denominated assets ex- 
perience the vicissitudes of Japanese financial markets. 
I assumed that assets and liabilities  in the Balance of  Payments Monthly 
falling under the four headings “trade credits,” “loans,” “external bonds,” and 
“others” took the form of long-term debt. However, the aggregate called “secu- 
rities”  includes portfolio investments in both bonds and stocks. Indeed, it is 
difficult to find statistics that distinguish between portfolio investment in debt 
and equity. Although the Ministry of Finance reports regional portfolio invest- 
ment in the August issue of Zaisei Kinyu Tokei Geppo (Monthly Statistics on 
Government Finance),  it  seems that these  data do not differentiate  between 
portfolio investment in bonds and in equity. Using data on Japanese investment 
into the United States reported in the Survey of  Current Business, I assumed 
arbitrarily that 40 percent of  the value of outward Japanese portfolio invest- 
ment was in equities and the rest in bonds.” I imposed the condition that these 
shares were also true of  inward portfolio investment into Japan. 
The appropriate asset market deflator for long-term debt is an index of bond 
prices for the relevant currency denomination. Long-term interest rates on gov- 
ernment debt are reported in the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics, and it was assumed that the average duration of the bonds 
in question was 10 years. Then a simple formula allows one to construct a bond 
price index for four of the five regions.” These indexes are graphed in figure 
10.1.  That figure shows that the general drop in interest rates in the past decade 
was  a source of capital  gains for Japanese  investors holding  long-term  debt 
denominated in dollars and sterling. 
The International  Monetary  Fund’s International  Financial  Statistics  also 
reports price indexes for industrial shares in the markets of Japan, the United 
Kingdom,  the  United  States, and  Australia.  Following  Dewald  and  Ulan 
(1990), I revalued Japanese outward and inward foreign direct investment us- 
ing local market indexes.13 These indexes  are graphed  in figure  10.2. Thus 
Japanese investors holding equity in the United States and Europe enjoyed ap- 
preciable capital gains in the past decade. 
11. The June  1990 issue of  the Survey of  Current Business (56, table  1) shows that Japanese 
investors acquired $1  15 billion of US.  securities other than Treasury securities in  1988 and 1989. 
They acquired $69 billion in corporate and  other bonds and $46 billion  in  corporate stocks in 
America those two years. 
12. See Sharpe, Alexander, and Bailey (1995, 469-71)  for a good discussion of duration and 
bond prices. I used bond prices in the United Kingdom as a proxy for European bond prices, and 
I assumed that  all debt extended to the Communist bloc was denominated  in dollars. Thus the 
bond index for the United States was also used to evaluate the market price of debt in the Commu- 
nist bloc. If the average duration of debt is actually less than 10 years, then these indexes overstate 
the effects of interest rate changes on the prices of bonds. 
13. The index for the Communist bloc is simply an index of nominal GDP in  the People’s 
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The last effect that must be accounted for in constructing the market value 
of the net international position is the effect that currency prices have on the 
market value of direct or portfolio  investment.  I  used the end-of-period  ex- 
change rates reported in International Financial Statistics to adjust the value 
of the stock of assets accordingly. These exchange rates are the dollar prices 326  Eric 0”. Fisher 
of the yen, the pound  sterling,  the Australian  dollar, and the huan. The ex- 
change rate indexes are graphed in figure 10.3. They confirm the general long- 
term appreciation of the yen against the dollar and the analogous depreciation 
of sterling, the Australian dollar, and the huan. Thus Japanese outward direct 
investment  has suffered capital losses owing to exchange rate movements in 
each of these broad regions, while inward investment into Japan has experi- 
enced capital gains owing to the appreciation of the yen. 
These indexes enable one to calculate the market value of Japanese outward 
and inward direct investment.I4 The rapid increase in Japanese outward direct 
investment first occurred early in the past decade. In 1982, the market value of 
Japan’s net foreign assets was $12 billion, and by  1992, that figure had grown 
to $687 billion. Also, by  1992, Japan held 76 percent of its net foreign assets 
in the United States and 10 percent in Europe. The share of net foreign assets 
in Australia was  I1 percent and that in the Communist bloc was 3 percent. 
Since the low volume of direct investment into Japan is well documented,” 
these shares show that Japan’s outward foreign investment in the past decade 
was directed primarily into the United States. Indeed, movements in American 
asset prices  have an  increasingly  important  role in  determining the  market 
value of Japanese assets and thus influence Japan’s aggregate generational cur- 
rent  account. In essence, the well-being of Japanese residents  is much more 
dependent, both absolutely  and relatively,  on  macroeconomic factors in the 
United States than was the case two decades ago. 
Table 10.1 presents Japan’s aggregate generational current account. Column 
(1) shows the market  value  of Japan’s international  investment position;  net 
foreign assets were adjusted using the price indexes and exchange rates dis- 
played above. The market value of these net assets is about 60 percent higher 
than the Bank of Japan’s own figure for 1992.16  The surge in Japanese outward 
investment coincided with the boom in world equity markets after the recession 
of the past decade; thus Japan’s overseas investments have shown strong capital 
gains. Still, the outward investments in Europe bore a better rate of return than 
those in the United  States. Also, although the rate of return on holding yen- 
denominated  assets was quite high in the past  15 years,  the low  volume of 
inward investment into Japan has limited the increase of Japan’s liabilities vis- 
8-vis the rest of the world. 
Column (2) of table 10.1 presents Japan’s net transfers from abroad. Fisher 
14. Let K, he the market value in dollars of direct investment in country  i at time t. Let 4 be the 
analogous increase in the dollar value of’ assets. I used the recursive relationship 
where P  is the relevant asset price index and S:  is the dollar price of  a unit of currency i both at 
time t. 
15. See Lawrence ( 1993) for an extensive discussion. 
16. Table 17 of the Balance of Payments Monthly for April  1993 states that the dollar value of 
Japan’s external assets at the end of  1992 was $5 14 billion. 327  Generational Accounts in the Open Economy 
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Fig. 10.3  Exchange rate indexes 
and Woo (1997) computed the present value of capitalized transfers for Korea, 
but they made the assumption that military and economic transfers into Korea 
formed a part of the United States’ long-run military policy. I have made the 
judgment here that Japan’s transfers to abroad are not part of ongoing interna- 
tional  commitments. This opinion  reflects the role imposed by  the United 
States on Japan in the postwar era. Indeed, the single large transfer of $12 
billion in  1991 was a contribution to the Allies’ defense of Kuwait. This com- 
pensation is precisely the kind of one-off payment showing that these unilat- 
eral transfers are not part of a continuing geopolitical role imposing long-run 
liabilities on the residents of Japan. 
Column (3) in table 10.1 gives the present value of the net foreign assets of 
Japan under the assumption that the value of these assets was zero at the begin- 
ning of  1973. It is impressive that the dollar value of  Japanese net foreign 
assets has grown more rapidly than the nominal interest rate in  the past 20 
years. Of course, such an accumulation reflects a rapid increase in the expected 
flow of goods and services into Japan in the future. The aggregate generational 
current account is given in column (4) of table 10.1; this column simply pre- 
sents first differences of the data in the previous column. It shows that the rapid 
increase in the present  value of  Japanese net foreign assets first occurred in 
1982. Thus the end of the last major recession marked the advent of Japan’s 
sustained external surplus. This observation is confirmed by  the data on the 
present value of the conventional current account reported in column (5). The 328  Eric 0”. Fisher 
Table 10.1  Japan’s Aggregate Generational Current Account 
Net International  Present Value 
Investment  Aggregate  of  the 
Position at  Transfers  Present Value  Generational  Conventional 
Market Values  from Abroad  of (I) + (2)  Current Account  Measure 
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aggregate generational current account and the present value of  the conven- 
tional measure are highly correlated; they differ in years when large fluctua- 
tions in asset prices or exchange rates precipitate large changes in the market 
value of net foreign assets. At  such times, the conventional current account 
surplus is a poor measure of the increase in the expected present value of re- 
sources imported from abroad in the future. 
10.4  The Generational Pattern of Ownership of Net Foreign Assets 
Who owns Japan’s net foreign assets? The data in section 10.3 showed how 
the market value of  Japan’s net international investment position has evolved 
since 1973. But who has benefited from the large capital gains that Japan expe- 
rienced on its outward investment in the past decade? And who owes the rela- 
tively small amount of yen-denominated liabilities that Japan has issued during 
the past 15 years? This section answers those questions by assuming that these 
assets and liabilities are allocated according to the patterns of saving and bor- 
rowing of Japan’s residents during the past three decades. 
Japan’s savings rate rose and then fell in  the past three decades; Horioka 
(1993) gives a good historical overview, and Ito and Kitamura (1994) show 329  Generational Accounts in the Open Economy 
how savings rates in Japan are influenced by public policy. The Statistics Bu- 
reau of Japan’s Management and Coordination Agency presents time series on 
family income and expenditure in Japan. It gathers these data from a random 
sample of  households of Japanese  residents.  I used data from the bureau’s 
Comprehensive  Time Series Report on the Family Income  and  Expenditure 
Survey: 1947-1986  (1988) to construct the savings and borrowing rates of 13 
different “generations” of Japanese residents. 
A generation is a cohort of Japanese residents born during the five-year pe- 
riod whose central year is used as its label. I identify the first generation with 
1906,17  and subsequent generations occur quinquennially until 1966. For each 
year between 1966 and 1986, the Family Income and Expenditure Survey gives 
the total savings and liabilities of the average household in a generation, and it 
describes the number of households sampled. Thus I was able to compute the 
share of total savings and also total liabilities that accrued to any one genera- 
tion in the sample. I used data from the years 1973, 1978, 1983, and 198818  to 
construct the savings and borrowing rates for each of  the generations in  my 
sample. In  1973, the generations born later than  1951 were assumed not yet 
economically active, and by  1988, the generations born after 1966, including 
those not yet born in 1991, were analogously inactive. 
The  savings rates  were  used  to  allocate new  outward  investment to  the 
agents in the generations economically active in that year. Likewise, the bor- 
rowing rates were used to assign new yen-denominated liabilities among the 
generations active in that year. Since Japan’s transfers to abroad have not been 
enduring, I allocated each year’s unilateral transfers as a lump-sum tax whose 
burden was distributed uniformly on the agents who were economically active 
in that year. Then I was able to construct the market value of the net interna- 
tional investment position of each generation for each year between 1973 and 
1992. These calculations are entirely analogous to those underlying the con- 
struction of the market value of Japan’s net international investment position, 
inclusive of the burden of unilateral transfers to abroad, but new investment 
and new borrowing  are assigned in each year according to the  savings and 
borrowing rates of the economically active generations. These data are stocks 
of assets, and they are denominated in current dollars. Finally, I divided them 
by  the number of people in each generation in  1993. Thus the data are pre- 
sented in 1992 dollars per person. 
Column (1) of table  10.2 presents the generational pattern  of  Japan’s  net 
international investment position, broadly defined. The calculations presented 
in table 10.2 make the assumption that a generation’s mortality rate is 6 percent 
per quinquennium, independent of  the  age of the cohort. Column (1) is a 
benchmark showing that members of the oldest generation in 1992 own sub- 
stantial net foreign assets. The generation born around 1926 has benefited from 
17. My first generation is really people born before 1909 who are still alive in 1993, but I identify 
this group with the 1906 generation, those born between 1904 and 1908, inclusive. In contrast with 
Auerbach et al. (1991), I put males and females together. 
18. I actually used data from 1986 as a proxy for those from 1988. 330  Eric 0”. Fisher 
the capital gains in world securities markets more than those before and after 
it because its years of peak savings occurred at the time when Japan’s external 
surplus first began to grow most rapidly and world asset markets were histori- 
cally undervalued. The modest positions of the generations born around 196  1 
and 1966 reflect the fact they paid for Japan’s contribution to the Persian Gulf 
War before they had begun to accumulate substantial net foreign assets. Gener- 
ations born after 1966 have no net foreign assets because they are not economi- 
cally active and I have assumed they have no liability for future transfer pay- 
ments to abroad. 
The calculations inherent  in column (1) of  table  10.2 allow me to make 
forecasts about the effects of three different policy scenarios on the welfare of 
these different generations. I examine three changes in exogenous variables 
from the 1992 benchmark: a strong yen, a rise in dollar interest rates, and rapid 
economic growth in China. The first situation entails an appreciation of the 
yen: a rise in the dollar price of the yen from 0.00816 (its value in  1992) to 
0.0125 dollars per yen (near its current value in  1995). The second assumes 
that dollar interest rates rise from 7.01 percent per annum (its value in  1992) 
to  10.00 percent  per annum. The third  situation assumes that Chinese eco- 
nomic growth stays more robust than the world average; I modeled this as a 20 
percent capital gain in the Japanese assets in the Communist bloc. 
Columns (2), (3),  and (4) of table 10.2 show the outcomes of each of these 
scenarios respectively. A strong yen causes a Pareto worsening for the Japanese 
Table 10.2  Generational Pattern of Japanese Net Foreign Assets 
Net Foreign  Higher Dollar 
Assets  Yen Appreciation  Interest Rates  Robust Chinese Growth 
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because the real value of their liabilities have risen. Thus the present value of 
net foreign assets for every generation is lower, and generations in their middle 
age in 1992 suffer capital losses especially.” These generations have incurred 
liabilities to foreigners as Japan’s traditional barriers to inward foreign invest- 
ment have relaxed slightly in the past decade. Higher dollar interest rates are a 
capital loss on the dollar-denominated bonds that are such a large part of the 
net foreign assets of many generations. A rise in dollar rates is Pareto inferior 
to the benchmark.  Still, this situation is not Pareto superior to the strong yen 
scenario; the generations born  around  1911 and  1916 actually lose slightly 
more  in this situation  than they do under a strong yen. Finally, even if  the 
Chinese economic boom continues, there will be little effect on the Japanese. 
This is so because Japan held only 3 percent  of its net foreign assets in the 
Communist bloc in  1992. Capital gains on Chinese assets represent a slight 
Pareto improvement over the benchmark. 
The important point in each of these three cases is that these generational 
profiles of assets illustrate in intuitive ways the effects that changes in macro- 
economic variables have on the welfare of the Japanese. For example, the gen- 
erational asset profiles worsen immediately  when the yen appreciates.  Since 
the trade balance adjusts over time, the conventional current account worsens 
only slowly in analogous historical situations. The aggregate generational cur- 
rent account shows that the real effects of a strong yen are the immediate capi- 
tal  losses  sustained by  Japanese  investors owing net  foreign  assets. These 
losses  are so obvious that they have become the standard  grist of financial 
journalists in the last few months.  The conventional current account barely 
captures such contemporaneous effects at all. 
10.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a measure of the Japanese external surplus that 
has its foundation in economic theory. The Japanese have accumulated net for- 
eign assets at a remarkable rate in the past 20 years, and their economic well- 
being is now inextricably tied into the smooth functioning of the world finan- 
cial system. There have been other countries that have accumulated net foreign 
assets at a pace greater than the rate of  interest over long periods: Britain in 
the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century are two 
important  examples. It is tempting to draw historical  parallels  between  the 
overvaluation of the sterling after the First World War and the current strength 
of  the yen. But I am not a bold or competent enough historian to predict that 
Japan will suffer a prolonged deterioration in its standard of living if the yen 
remains as strong as it is now. Still, a generational perspective on the external 
surplus shows that large movements in the real exchange rate have immediate 
effects on the market value of assets. 
19. I am implicitly assuming a real appreciation of the yen. In a world with not traded goods, the 
negative income effect of the yen appreciation is not fully offset by a drop in all consumer prices, 332  Eric 0”. Fisher 
Finally, it is important that international economists recognize that the con- 
ventional current account depends on the timing of cross-border payments. The 
International Monetary Fund’s Balance ojPayments Manual (1977) is a classic 
statement of careful cash-flow accounting principles, and I have relied on it in 
interpreting the capital account statistics that I have analyzed in this chapter. I 
am not advocating throwing out the baby with the bathwater because it is in- 
deed obvious that the conventional current account is highly correlated with 
the  aggregate generational  current  account. Thus the  conventional  measure 
does have practical economic significance, especially if one is willing to inter- 
pret the conventional current account within the discipline of an explicit eco- 
nomic model. But accurate cash-flow accounts are only part of a bigger picture, 
and I hope that this chapter spurs further research into accrual-based interna- 
tional accounts. 
Appendix 
Description of  the Data 
The data on the net foreign assets of Japan were constructed from the annual 
long-term capital transactions  reported  in the regional  balance  of payments 
summaries in the April issues of  the Bank of  Japan’s Kokusai Shushi Tokei 
Geppo (Balance of Payments Monthly). The capital account covers six catego- 
ries: direct investments, trade credits, loans, securities, external bonds, and oth- 
ers. The four regions selected were not entirely consistent across the 20 years 
of the sample. The geographic definitions for the United States and the Com- 
munist bloc are consistent. That for Europe actually covers the United King- 
dom and the European Community in  1973 and  1974 and corresponds to the 
European  Economic Community, including its new members as it enlarged, 
between  1975 and  1992. The data for Australia  include  New  Zealand  and 
South Africa until 1981, and they consist of the category “other OECD’ from 
1982 to 1988. After that they include Australia alone. The disaggregated Japa- 
nese capital account figures reverse the signs for assets (outward flows of capi- 
tal) but not for liabilities in the years from 1973 to 1978. Since the aggregated 
figures always follow the usual convention (an increase in assets takes a nega- 
tive sign), this inconsistency can be vexing. Future researchers beware! 
In later years, Kokusai Shushi Tokei Geppo also includes a table on the exter- 
nal assets and liabilities of Japan. The text uses figures from this table when 
comparing the market value of Japan’s net foreign assets with the official fig- 
ures reported by the Bank of Japan. 
Direct investments and 40 percent of the value of  securities were revalued 
using the annual industrial share price indexes given in the International Mone- 
tary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. The indexes were for Japan, the 333  Generational Accounts in the Open Economy 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The analogous series for 
the Communist bloc was an index of the national income of the People’s Re- 
public of China at market prices as reported in International Financial Statis- 
tics. The categories “trade credits,” “loans,” 60 percent of  “securities,” “exter- 
nal bonds,” and “others” were revalued using a bond price index constructed 
from the annual interest rates on long-term government debt reported in Inter- 
national Financial Statistics. Again, the data are interest rates from Japan, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. It was assumed that debt 
extended to the Communist bloc was denominated in dollars. The exchange 
rate indexes are the end-of-period dollar prices of foreign exchange for Japan, 
the United Kingdom, the People’s Republic of China, and Australia, all taken 
from International Financial Statistics. 
The data on household  saving and borrowing rates are from the Statistics 
Bureau  of Japan’s  Management and Coordination Agency’s  Comprehensive 
Time Series Report on the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, 1947-1 986 
(table 8-2). I used the columns entitled ‘ho. of tabulated households,” “sav- 
ings,” and “liabilities” from the years 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1986 (as a proxy 
for 1988). The 1993 populations for the different generations are reported in 
the Statistics Bureau of Japan’s Management and Coordination Agency’s Japan 
Statistical Yearbook, 1995 (table 2-9).  The per capita asset figures assume im- 
plicitly all assets acquired between  1973 and 1992 by  a given generation are 
held by the members of that generation living in 1993. 
The text refers at several times to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Sur- 
vey of  Current Business. The data giving U.S. international transactions by area 
(September 1994, table 10) were the basis for allocating 60 percent of securi- 
ties to bonds and the rest to equity. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 of  the May 1994 issue 
report data on Japan’s direct investment into the United States by  industry in 
1992 and 1993. 
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